牛皓玮, 刘达, 陈广娟. 双碳及能源安全背景下电煤供需策略演化博弈研究[J]. 智慧电力, 2022, 50(9): 8-15.
引用本文: 牛皓玮, 刘达, 陈广娟. 双碳及能源安全背景下电煤供需策略演化博弈研究[J]. 智慧电力, 2022, 50(9): 8-15.
NIU Hao-wei, LIU Da, CHEN Guang-juan. Evolutionary Game of Thermal Coal Supply and Demand Strategy Under Carbon Peak,Carbon Neutrality and Energy Security[J]. Smart Power, 2022, 50(9): 8-15.
Citation: NIU Hao-wei, LIU Da, CHEN Guang-juan. Evolutionary Game of Thermal Coal Supply and Demand Strategy Under Carbon Peak,Carbon Neutrality and Energy Security[J]. Smart Power, 2022, 50(9): 8-15.

双碳及能源安全背景下电煤供需策略演化博弈研究

Evolutionary Game of Thermal Coal Supply and Demand Strategy Under Carbon Peak,Carbon Neutrality and Energy Security

  • 摘要: 基于实现“双碳”目标和保障能源安全的现实背景,本文针对电煤供需矛盾,构建了政府、煤炭企业和发电企业三方政府规制下的电煤供需演化博弈模型,分析了博弈主体策略的稳定性,并应用数值仿真分析探讨了模型的演化路径及影响因素。结果表明,政府策略最终会向消极规制演化,而煤碳企业和发电企业的策略最终会向增加供给和不限电演化;不同的政府奖惩力度与煤炭中长协合同履约率会对煤炭企业和发电企业的策略选择产生差异化影响。

     

    Abstract: Based on the realistic background of achieving carbon peak and carbon neutrality goals & ensuring energy security,an evolutionary game model of thermal coal supply and demand is built regulated by the government,coal enterprises and power generation enterprises. The stability of game strategy main body is analyzed,and the evolution path and influencing factors of the model are discussed through numerical simulation analysis. The results show that the government strategy will eventually evolve towards negative regulation,while the strategies of coal and power generation enterprises will eventually evolve towards increasing supply and not restricting electricity. Different government rewards and penalties & contract performance rates of coal medium and long term agreement will have different effects on the strategy choices of coal and power generation enterprises.

     

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