A Consortium Blockchain-Enabled Double Auction Mechanism for Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading among Prosumers

Shichang Cui; Shuang Xu; Fei Hu; Yong Zhao; Jinyu Wen; Jinsong Wang

doi:10.23919/PCMP.2023.000038

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A Consortium Blockchain-Enabled Double Auction Mechanism for Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading among Prosumers

Contents | 更新时间：2026-09-30

- A Consortium Blockchain-Enabled Double Auction Mechanism for Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading among Prosumers
- A Consortium Blockchain-Enabled Double Auction Mechanism for Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading among Prosumers
- 现代电力系统保护与控制（英文） 2024年9卷第3期页码：82-97
- 作者机构：
  
  1. State Key Laboratory of Advanced Electromagnetic Engineering and Technology, Huazhong University of Science and Technology,Wuhan,China
  2. State Grid Hubei Electrical Power Co., Ltd. Economics Research Institute,Wuhan,China
- 作者简介：
- 基金信息：
- DOI：10.23919/PCMP.2023.000038
  中图分类号：
- 纸质出版：2024-05-01
- 稿件说明：
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Shichang Cui, Shuang Xu, Fei Hu, 等. A Consortium Blockchain-Enabled Double Auction Mechanism for Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading among Prosumers[J]. 现代电力系统保护与控制（英文）, 2024,9(3):82-97.

Shichang Cui, Shuang Xu, Fei Hu, et al. A Consortium Blockchain-Enabled Double Auction Mechanism for Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading among Prosumers[J]. Protection and Control of Modern Power Systems, 2024, 9(3): 82-97.
Shichang Cui, Shuang Xu, Fei Hu, 等. A Consortium Blockchain-Enabled Double Auction Mechanism for Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading among Prosumers[J]. 现代电力系统保护与控制（英文）, 2024,9(3):82-97. DOI： 10.23919/PCMP.2023.000038.

Shichang Cui, Shuang Xu, Fei Hu, et al. A Consortium Blockchain-Enabled Double Auction Mechanism for Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading among Prosumers[J]. Protection and Control of Modern Power Systems, 2024, 9(3): 82-97. DOI： 10.23919/PCMP.2023.000038.

摘要

Abstract

This paper investigates a double auction-based peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading market for a community of renewable prosumers with private information on reservation price and quantity of energy to be traded. A novel competition padding auction (CPA) mechanism for P2P energy trading is proposed to address the budget deficit problem while holding the advantages of the widely-used Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. To illustrate the theoretical properties of the CPA mechanism

the sufficient conditions are identified for a truth-telling equilibrium with a budget surplus to exist

while further proving its asymptotical economic efficiency. In addition

the CPA mechanism is implemented through consortium blockchain smart contracts to create safer

faster

and larger P2P energy trading markets. The proposed mechanism is embedded into blockchain consensus protocols for high consensus efficiency

and the budget surplus of the CPA mechanism motivates the prosumers to manage the blockchain. Case studies are carried out to show the effectiveness of the proposed method.

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