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强 仁, 龚钢军, 王大为, 等. 信息物理耦合特征下变电站内生脆弱性和扰动后风险评估[J]. 电力系统保护与控制, 2026,54(19).
QIANG Ren, GONG Gangjun, WANG Dawei, et al. Endogenous vulnerability and post-disturbance risk assessment of substations considering cyber-physical coupling characteristics[J]. Power System Protection and Control, 2026, 54(19).
强 仁, 龚钢军, 王大为, 等. 信息物理耦合特征下变电站内生脆弱性和扰动后风险评估[J]. 电力系统保护与控制, 2026,54(19). DOI: 10.19783/j.cnki.pspc.260338.
QIANG Ren, GONG Gangjun, WANG Dawei, et al. Endogenous vulnerability and post-disturbance risk assessment of substations considering cyber-physical coupling characteristics[J]. Power System Protection and Control, 2026, 54(19). DOI: 10.19783/j.cnki.pspc.260338.
针对数智化变电站信息物理强耦合性引发系统脆弱性的问题,提出适配时序安全场景的广域系统关键节点辨识和风险评估方法。首先,基于IEC 61850协议栈对象模型和通信模式,分析典型报文核心功能边界、时序同步依赖机制与内生脆弱特征。其次,因开放式协议存在未经授权访问威胁,提出变电站网络风险传导路径和广义断线跳闸扰动方式。然后,针对国家背书型攻击具备的广域致瘫和链路隐蔽特征,提出多站点、潜入式的精准时间同步协同扰动方式。最后,基于直流最优潮流模型和序贯蒙特卡洛方法,构建变电站扰动风险评估框架。在IEEE-RTS79测试系统中进行仿真验证。结果表明,针对关键节点组合开展协同攻击将导致严重的系统级联失效,相较于单点攻击,协同攻击显著增加了系统失负荷风险,验证了利用时间同步协议开展多站点扰动的有效性。
To address the system vulnerability issue induced by strong cyber-physical coupling in smart substations
a wide-area critical node identification and risk assessment method tailored to time-sequence security scenarios is proposed. First
based on the IEC 61850 protocol stack object model and communication patterns
the core functional boundaries of typical messages
time-synchronization dependency mechanisms
and inherent vulnerability characteristics are analyzed. Second
given the unauthorized access threats in open protocols
substation network risk propagation paths and generalized trip-type disturbance patterns are proposed. Then
in response to the characteristics of state-sponsored attacks featuring wide-area incapacitation and link-layer stealth
a multi-site
stealth-infiltration-based concurrent precise time-synchronization disturbance method is proposed. Finally
based on the DC optimal power flow model and the sequential Monte Carlo method
a substation disturbance risk assessment framework is constructed. The proposed framework is validated through simulations on the IEEE-RTS79 test system. The results demonstrate that coordinated attacks targeting critical node combinations can induce severe system cascading failures. Compared with single-point attacks
coordinated attacks significantly increase the system load-loss risk
thereby validating the effectiveness of conducting multi-site disturbances using time synchronization protocols.
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国家计算机网络应急技术处理协调中心. 关于国家授时中心遭受美国国家安全局网络攻击事件的技术分析报告[R]. 北京: 国家计算机网络应急技术处理协调中心, 2025.
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MOUSSA B, ROBILLARD C, ZUGENMAIER A, et al. Securing the precision time protocol (PTP) against fake timestamps[J]. IEEE Communications Letters, 2019, 23(2): 278-281.
南京南瑞继电保护电器有限公司等. 变电站通信网络和系统 第5部分:功能的通信要求和装置模型: DL/T 860.5—2006[S]. 北京: 中国电力出版社, 2006.
P. M. Subcommittee. IEEE reliability test system[J]. IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, 1979, PAS-98, 6: 2047-2054.
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