Mechanism Design for Ancillary Service Market Considering Social Welfare and Fairness

Zhi Wu; Yuanxi Wu; Wei Gu; Zheng Xu; Shu Zheng; Jingtao Zhao

doi:10.17775/CSEEJPES.2022.01510

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Mechanism Design for Ancillary Service Market Considering Social Welfare and Fairness

Regular Papers | 更新时间：2026-10-15

- Mechanism Design for Ancillary Service Market Considering Social Welfare and Fairness
- Mechanism Design for Ancillary Service Market Considering Social Welfare and Fairness
- 中国电机工程学会电力与能源系统学报(英文) 2024年10卷第3期页码：1000-1010
- 作者机构：
  
  1. School of Electrical Engineering, Southeast University,Nanjing,China
  2. NARI Technology Co., Ltd.,Nanjing,China
- 作者简介：
- 基金信息：
- DOI：10.17775/CSEEJPES.2022.01510
  中图分类号：
- 纸质出版：2024-05-01
- 稿件说明：
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Zhi Wu, Yuanxi Wu, Wei Gu, 等. Mechanism Design for Ancillary Service Market Considering Social Welfare and Fairness[J]. 中国电机工程学会电力与能源系统学报(英文), 2024,10(3):1000-1010.

Zhi Wu, Yuanxi Wu, Wei Gu, et al. Mechanism Design for Ancillary Service Market Considering Social Welfare and Fairness[J]. CSEE Journal of Power and Energy Systems, 2024, 10(3): 1000-1010.
Zhi Wu, Yuanxi Wu, Wei Gu, 等. Mechanism Design for Ancillary Service Market Considering Social Welfare and Fairness[J]. 中国电机工程学会电力与能源系统学报(英文), 2024,10(3):1000-1010. DOI： 10.17775/CSEEJPES.2022.01510.

Zhi Wu, Yuanxi Wu, Wei Gu, et al. Mechanism Design for Ancillary Service Market Considering Social Welfare and Fairness[J]. CSEE Journal of Power and Energy Systems, 2024, 10(3): 1000-1010. DOI： 10.17775/CSEEJPES.2022.01510.

摘要

Abstract

Increasing penetration of distributed energy resources in the distribution network (DN) is threatening safe operation of the DN

which necessitates setup of the ancillary service market in the DN. In the ancillary service market

distribution system operator (DSO) is responsible for safety of the DN by procuring available capacities of aggregators. Unlike existing studies

this paper proposes a novel market mechanism composed of two parts: choice rule and payment rule. The proposed choice rule simultaneously considers social welfare and fairness

encouraging risk-averse aggregators to participate in the ancillary service market. It is then formulated as a linear programming problem

and a distributed solution using the multi-cut Benders decomposition is presented. Moreover

successful implementation of the choice rule depends on each aggregator's truthful adoption of private parameters. Therefore

a payment rule is also designed

which is proved to possess two properties: incentive compatibility and individual rationality. Simulation results demonstrate effectiveness of the proposed choice rule on improving fairness and verify properties of the payment rule.

关键词

Keywords

references

15. D. G. Energy. ( 2019 ). Directive (eu) 2019/944 on common rules for the internal market for electricity and amending directive 2012/27/eu . [Online ] . Available: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32019L0944from=EN

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