ZHANG Zhiqiang, YUAN Zhi, 1, et al. Low-carbon Optimization Strategy for Integrated Energy Systems Based on Three-level Stackelberg Game Considering Carbon-source Uncertainties[J]. 2026, 50(1): 157-167.
ZHANG Zhiqiang, YUAN Zhi, 1, et al. Low-carbon Optimization Strategy for Integrated Energy Systems Based on Three-level Stackelberg Game Considering Carbon-source Uncertainties[J]. 2026, 50(1): 157-167. DOI: 10.13335/j.1000-3673.pst.2025.0438.
multi-level collaborative optimization is imperative for the advancement of integrated energy systems. However
the establishment of multi- stakeholder
multi-level collaborative optimization remains an urgent problem that necessitates immediate attention. Furthermore
the uncertainties in wind and solar power outputs
as well as carbon emission intensities
further exacerbate the difficulty of optimal scheduling. In light of these challenges
this paper proposes a low-carbon optimization strategy for integrated energy systems based on a three-layer master-slave game model that considers carbon source uncertainty. The proposed methodology involves constructing a three-level master-slave game model. The upper-level leader is the distribution system operator
responsible for developing and implementing tariff strategies. The middle-level key leader is the integrated energy operator
tasked with optimizing multi-energy dispatch. The lower-level follower is the user aggregator
responsible for managing demand response resources. Second
a two-stage distributional robust optimization model based on the Wasserstein distance is constructed to address the impact of uncertainty in wind and solar output
as well as carbon emission intensity
on system operation. Subsequently
the three-layer model is transformed into a two-layer model by employing the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) condition. The model is then solved through a combination of the dichotomy method and the column and constraint generation algorithm. Finally
simulation results demonstrate that the proposed strategy can achieve a balance of interests among all parties
coordinate the optimization of operations
enhance the system's ability to respond to carbon source uncertainties