NI Fangyuan, GUO Jingrong, XIANG Yue, et al. Multi-market Mixed-game Trading Strategies for Electric Vehicle Aggregators With Consumption of Renewable Energy[J]. 2026, 46(16): 5711-5724.
NI Fangyuan, GUO Jingrong, XIANG Yue, et al. Multi-market Mixed-game Trading Strategies for Electric Vehicle Aggregators With Consumption of Renewable Energy[J]. 2026, 46(16): 5711-5724.DOI: 10.13334/j.0258-8013.pcsee.250578.
In the context of the novel electricity market framework
electric vehicle aggregators (EVAs) serve as intermediaries connecting the generation side and electric vehicle (EV) users. While undertaking the responsibility of renewable energy (RE) consumption
they further optimize their power purchase and sale strategies to maximize operational revenue. In this paper
a mixed-game model is proposed. First
a Stackelberg master-slave game model of government-EVAs is established for the upper-level government to develop a long-term RE pricing strategy and a weighting assessment mechanism for the consumption responsibility. The upper-level government aims to develop medium- and long-term RE pricing strategy and responsibility weight mechanism to maximize the RE consumption rate and minimize policy costs. Secondly
EVAs
as followers
construct a non-cooperative game model seekng to minimize electricity purchase costs after receiving price information and incentive /penalty factors. In addition
a multi-market power purchase and sale strategy that includes medium- and long- term markets
spot markets
tradable green certificates (TGC)
and power excess consumption trading (PECT) is formulated. Finally
the bisection method is used to update the pricing strategy based on the updated multi-market purchase and sale strategies of EVAs
thus iteratively solving the Stackelberg equilibrium solutions. The research results indicate that the proposed trading strategy balances the interests of multiple stakeholders
and effectively promotes the consumption of RE as well as reduces costs of government and EVA.