YANG Zhifang, WANG Xianlin, LI Qirui, et al. Goal-oriented Electricity Market Mechanism Design: Fundamental Framework and Case Studies[J]. 2026, 46(8): 3145-3156.
YANG Zhifang, WANG Xianlin, LI Qirui, et al. Goal-oriented Electricity Market Mechanism Design: Fundamental Framework and Case Studies[J]. 2026, 46(8): 3145-3156.DOI: 10.13334/j.0258-8013.pcsee.250312.
A scientifically sound market mechanism is essential for ensuring that electricity markets achieve efficient resource allocation. Owing to stringent real-time balancing requirements and the diversity of generation technologies
electricity market mechanisms developed on the basis of classical economic principles often fail to effectively coordinate multiple market organization objectives. Existing studies and practices typically rely on “patchwork” modifications to improve market mechanisms
which makes it difficult to ensure the realization of the intended mechanism effectiveness. Distinct from the conventional market design paradigm that primarily seeks to satisfy economic axioms
this paper proposes a goal-oriented electricity market design framework. The framework takes the expected incentive effectiveness as the design objective and realizes a closed-loop market design by regulating key boundary parameters. To verify the effectiveness of the proposed approach
this paper investigates typical design problems
including capacity market demand curve design
renewable capacity credit determination
and the coordination between the energy market and the peaking market. The results demonstrate that the proposed method can guide the optimization of market mechanism design based on mechanism effectiveness
thereby ensuring that the market mechanism achieves the expected objectives. Case studies further indicate that the proposed framework can provide useful insights for the coordinated design of multi-timescale markets
market-based coordination among different types of generation resources