1. 广东工业大学 管理学院,广东,广州,510520
2. 广东工业大学 自动化学院,广东,广州,510006
彭镇(1986–),男,讲师,博士,主要研究方向为公司治理和公司财务
彭祖群(1990–),女,助理实验师,硕士,主要研究方向为技术创新管理,E-mail:pengzuqun@163.com
网络首发:2022-07-10,
纸质出版:2022
移动端阅览
彭镇, 彭祖群, 陈修德. 内部与外部薪酬差距——激励有效性之比较及互动[J]. 广东工业大学学报, 2022, 39(4): 55-65.
Peng Zhen, Peng Zu-qun, Chen Xiu-de. Internal- and External-Firm Pay Gap: The Comparison and Interaction of Incentive Effectiveness[J]. 2022, 39(4): 55-65.
彭镇, 彭祖群, 陈修德. 内部与外部薪酬差距——激励有效性之比较及互动[J]. 广东工业大学学报, 2022, 39(4): 55-65. DOI: 10.12052/gdutxb.210171.
Peng Zhen, Peng Zu-qun, Chen Xiu-de. Internal- and External-Firm Pay Gap: The Comparison and Interaction of Incentive Effectiveness[J]. 2022, 39(4): 55-65. DOI: 10.12052/gdutxb.210171.
内部和外部薪酬差距是员工薪酬比较的两个重要方面,但已有大多数研究均孤立地考察它们的激励效应,对于二者的互动关系和作用边界缺乏足够的关注。本研究以A股工业类企业为例,比较分析了这两方面薪酬差距的创新激励效果及其互动关系。研究发现:(1) 单独来看,内外两方面的薪酬差距对企业创新效率均有显著影响,当将二者结合分析后,内部薪酬差距的抑制作用依然显著,外部薪酬差距的正向激励作用不再显著。为控制内生性,采用联立方程模型中的三阶段最小二乘法进行回归,结论一致。(2) 薪酬差距的激励作用存在异质性。具体来看,在非国有企业以及薪酬水平较低的企业中,内部薪酬差距的作用不显著,而外部薪酬差距能够显著促进企业创新效率的提升;在国有企业以及薪酬水平较高的企业中则正好相反,内部薪酬差距对企业创新效率有显著的抑制作用,而外部薪酬差距的作用不显著。本文拓展和丰富了薪酬激励和企业创新激励领域的研究,并对现实企业决策具有较强的启示意义。
Both internal- and external-firm pay gap are the two important aspects of employee compensation comparison. However
most of the existing literature has studied the incentive effect of internal- and external-firm pay gap separately
and paid insufficient attention to the combination
interaction and boundary between the two. Based on the samples of A-share industrial listed companies in China
the incentive effect and interactive relationship between internal- and external-firm pay gap are analyzed. The results show that: (1) Both internal- and external-firm pay gap have significant influences on corporate innovation efficiency separately. When integrating the two facts in one model
the inhibiting effect of internal-firm pay gap on corporate innovation efficiency is still significant
while the positive incentive effect of external-firm pay gap becomes insignificant. In order to control endogenous problem
the three-stage least square method in simultaneous equation model is used for regression
and the results are consistent with the above. (2) About the incentive effect of pay gap
there are significant differences in different types of enterprises. Specifically
in non-state-owned enterprises and enterprises with low salary level
internal-firm pay gap plays no significant role
while external-firm pay gap can significantly promote the improvement of corporate innovation efficiency. In state-owned enterprises and enterprises with high salary level
it is exactly the opposite. Internal-firm pay gap has a significant inhibiting effect on corporate innovation efficiency
while external-firm pay gap has no significant effect. Thus the research on compensation and corporate innovation incentive is expanded and enriched and has a strong enlightenment significance to the actual enterprise decision-making.
LEANA C R, MEURIS J. Living to work and working to live: income as a driver of organizational behavior [J]. The Academy of Management Annals, 2015, 9(1): 55-95.
SHAW J D. Pay dispersion [J]. Annual Review of Organizational Psychology, 2014, 1(1): 521-544.
WEI X H. A meta-analysis of the effects of pay level and pay dispersion on firm operational outcomes [J]. Advances in Psychological Science, 2016, 24(7): 1020-1031.
LAZONICK W, HUIJGEN F. The theory of the market economy and the social foundations of innovative enterprise [J]. Economic Industrial Democracy, 2003, 24(1): 9-44.
GUPTA A K, TESLUK P E, TAYLOR M S. Innovation at and across multiple levels of analysis [J]. Organization Science, 2007, 18(6): 885-897.
KONG D M, XU M L, KONG G W. Pay gap and firm innovation in china [J]. Economic Research Journal, 2017(10): 144-157.
BELLOC F. Corporate governance and innovation: a survey [J]. Journal of Economic Surveys, 2012, 26(5): 835-864.
JIANG W, WU J H, HU Y M. Manager-employee pay gap and firm innovation: an empirical research based on listed companies in china [J]. Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics, 2018, 40(6): 74-88.
GUPTA N, CONROY S A, DELERY J E. The many faces of pay variation [J]. Human Resource Management Review, 2012, 22(2): 100-115.
TREVOR C O, REILLY G, GERHART B. Reconsidering pay dispersion's effect on the performance of interdependent work: reconciling sorting and pay inequality [J]. Academy of Management Journal, 2012, 55(3): 585-610.
LI W J, HU Y M. Who is encouraged by pay dispersion in state-owned enterprises? [J]. Economic Research Journal, 2012(12): 125-136.
LIN J Q, HUANG Z H, SUN Y X. TMT pay gap, firm performance and corporate governance [J]. Economic Research Journal, 2003(4): 31-40.
LIU C, SUN L. A study on relation of salary difference and firm performance: evidence from state-owned enterprises [J]. Nankai Business Review, 2010(2): 30-39.
ZHANG Z T. Top management team coordination needs, compensation dispersion and firm performance: a perspective of tournament theory [J]. Nankai Business Review, 2007, 10(2): 4-11.
ZHAO R. Executive-employee compensation gap and firm performance—an empirical study based on the panel data of china's listed manufacturing companies [J]. Economic Management, 2012, 34(5): 96-104.
FANG F, LI S. Research on the disparity in the remuneration of senior management in Chinese enterprises [J]. Social Sciences in China, 2015(8): 47-67.
LI W J, CEN Y S, HU Y M. Does external pay gap encourage top management? An empirical study based on managerial market and ownership type [J]. Nankai Business Review, 2014(4): 24-35.
PENG Z, CHEN X D, XU H. Research on the effect of external pay gap on the corporate innovation efficiency [J]. Securities Market Herald, 2020(12): 20-28.
WU L S, LIN J Y, WANG Y P. The external fairness of CEO's emolument, the nature of stock right and company's performance [J]. Management World, 2010(3): 117-126.
YANADORI Y, CUI V. Creating incentives for innovation? The relationship between pay dispersion in RD groups and firm innovation performance [J]. Strategic Management Journal, 2013, 34(12): 1502-1511.
DING D Z, AKHTA R S, GE G L. Effects of inter- and intra-hierarchy wage dispersions on firm performance in Chinese enterprises [J]. the International Journal of Human Resource Management, 2009, 20(11): 2370-2381.
HUANG H. The external unfairness, internal gap of executive compensation and firm performance [J]. Economic Management, 2012, 34(7): 81-92.
CHEN D H, FAN C L, SHEN Y J. Executives and employees: comparison and interaction of incentive effectiveness [J]. Management World, 2015(5): 160-171.
GREENE W. Fixed and random effects in stochastic frontier models [J]. Journal of Productivity Analysis, 2005, 23(1): 7-32.
JIANG W. Industry compensation benchmark and manager compensation growth: an empirical analysis based on Chinese listed companies [J]. Finance Research, 2010(4): 144-159.
FAULKENDER M W, YANG J. Inside the black box: the role and composition of compensation peer groups [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2010, 96(2): 257-270.
BIZJAK J, LEMMON M, NAVEEN L. Does the use of peer groups contribute to higher pay and less efficient compensation? [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2008, 90(2): 152-168.
MAJOR B, FORCEY B. Social comparisons and pay evaluations: preferences for same-sex and same-job wage comparisons [J]. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1985, 21(4): 393-405.
XIAO W, LIN G B. Government support, RD management and technological innovation efficiency: an empirical analysis based on China's industrial sector [J]. Management World, 2014(4): 71-80.
ZHAO B. Employee's perception of distributive justice and management suggestions [J]. Journal of Hunan University (Social Science Edition), 2000(S1): 12-15.
KIM T, LEUNG K. Forming and reacting to overall fairness: a cross-cultural comparison [J]. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 2007, 104(1): 83-95.
HE W, LONG L. The research of a composite motivation model of intrinsic and extrinsic compensation [J]. Management Review, 2011, 23(9): 93-101.
MENG X. Labour market reform in China[M]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
0
浏览量
0
下载量
0
CSCD
关联资源
相关文章
相关作者
相关机构
京公网安备11010802024621