高赐威, 曹家诚, 吕 冉, et al. Method for determining the internal price of virtual power plant based on stackelberg game theory[J]. 2021, 23(6).
DOI:
高赐威, 曹家诚, 吕 冉, et al. Method for determining the internal price of virtual power plant based on stackelberg game theory[J]. 2021, 23(6). DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1009-1831.2021.06.003.
Method for determining the internal price of virtual power plant based on stackelberg game theory
With the extensive access of user-side distributed power generation
the resources that can be aggregated in virtual power plants are gradually transiting to prosumers. There are two main strategies for traditional virtual power plants to aggregate user-side resources:One is direct load control
the other one is to guide users to adjust their energy demand through load forecasting and then unilaterally setting the price of electricity. However
the first one cannot respect the user’s energy preference
while the second one cannot accurately predict the user behavior
so the price signal cannot accurately guide the user behavior. Moreover
the above strategies don’t consider the user’s power generation capacity. Aiming at the above problems
a stackelberg game model between the two sides is established
to set the purchase and sale prices inside the virtual power plant
guiding prosumers to adjust the power generation and consumption strategies
and finally the external output of virtual power plant is formed. The case analysis shows that both the virtual power plant and the internal producers and consumers can get considerable benefits through the model proposed. The case also shows that the change of the price of the spot market has a great influence on the determination of the internal market electricity price of the virtual power plant.