QIANG Ren, GONG Gangjun, WANG Dawei, et al. Endogenous vulnerability and post-disturbance risk assessment of substations considering cyber-physical coupling characteristics[J]. Power System Protection and Control, 2026, 54(19).
DOI:
QIANG Ren, GONG Gangjun, WANG Dawei, et al. Endogenous vulnerability and post-disturbance risk assessment of substations considering cyber-physical coupling characteristics[J]. Power System Protection and Control, 2026, 54(19).DOI: 10.19783/j.cnki.pspc.260338.
Endogenous vulnerability and post-disturbance risk assessment of substations considering cyber-physical coupling characteristics
To address the system vulnerability issue induced by strong cyber-physical coupling in smart substations
a wide-area critical node identification and risk assessment method tailored to time-sequence security scenarios is proposed. First
based on the IEC 61850 protocol stack object model and communication patterns
the core functional boundaries of typical messages
time-synchronization dependency mechanisms
and inherent vulnerability characteristics are analyzed. Second
given the unauthorized access threats in open protocols
substation network risk propagation paths and generalized trip-type disturbance patterns are proposed. Then
in response to the characteristics of state-sponsored attacks featuring wide-area incapacitation and link-layer stealth
a multi-site
stealth-infiltration-based concurrent precise time-synchronization disturbance method is proposed. Finally
based on the DC optimal power flow model and the sequential Monte Carlo method
a substation disturbance risk assessment framework is constructed. The proposed framework is validated through simulations on the IEEE-RTS79 test system. The results demonstrate that coordinated attacks targeting critical node combinations can induce severe system cascading failures. Compared with single-point attacks
coordinated attacks significantly increase the system load-loss risk
thereby validating the effectiveness of conducting multi-site disturbances using time synchronization protocols.
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references
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