1. 1.南京理工大学自动化学院,江苏,南京,210094
2. 国网江苏省电力有限公司常州供电分公司,江苏,常州,213003
Published:2026
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季振东, 黄立飞, 虞坚阳, et al. 面向多利益主体的港区电能双层协调优化策略研究[J]. Power System Protection and Control, 2026, (1).
DOI:
季振东, 黄立飞, 虞坚阳, et al. 面向多利益主体的港区电能双层协调优化策略研究[J]. Power System Protection and Control, 2026, (1). DOI: 10.19783/j.cnki.pspc.250299.
为应对高比例分布式能源接入对港区能源和多主体利益结构的改变,提出一种面向多利益主体的港区电能双层协调优化策略。首先,介绍了港区能源系统架构,分析了各利益主体间的协调博弈过程。其次,建立了港区电能双层协调优化调度模型。上层主体为政府,通过制定合理的碳税政策实现下层整体成本的最小化。下层主从博弈的主体为港口集团和船东,港口集团为领导者,船东为跟随者。通过调整电能供需量来实现成本最小化,在供需平衡时达到博弈均衡。然后,分析了主从博弈模型的均衡条件和双层协调模型的具体求解方法。最后,通过算例对比分析了3种方案,验证了所提方法的经济性和环保性,为制定合理的“电能调度-碳税制定-岸电定价”策略提供了可靠建议。
To address the changes in port-area energy systems and multi-stakeholder benefit structure caused by the high proportion of distributed energy access
this paper proposes a bi-level coordinated optimization strategy for port-area electric energy considering multiple stakeholders. First
the energy system architecture of the port area is introduced
and the coordination game process among various stakeholders is analyzed. Second
a bi-level coordinated optimal scheduling model for port-area electric energy is established. The upper-level decision-maker is the government
which minimizes the overall cost at the lower level by formulating appropriate carbon tax policies. At the lower level
a master-slave game is formulated between the port group and shipowners
where the port group acts as the leader and the shipowners as followers. Cost minimization is achieved by adjusting electric energy supply and demand
and a game equilibrium is reached when the supply and demand are balanced. Then
the equilibrium conditions of the master-slave game model and the specific solution method for the bi-level coordination model are analyzed. Finally
three schemes are compared and analyzed through case studies
which verify the economy and environmental protection of the proposed method
providing reliable guidance for formulating coordinated strategies of “power dispatching-carbon tax formulation-shore power pricing”.
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