黄宁馨, 程兰芬, 禤培正, 周保荣, 周尚筹, 荆朝霞, 唐翀. 多主体梯级水电参与日前市场的联盟竞价策略与收益分配[J]. 电网与清洁能源, 2022, 38(10): 158-166.
引用本文: 黄宁馨, 程兰芬, 禤培正, 周保荣, 周尚筹, 荆朝霞, 唐翀. 多主体梯级水电参与日前市场的联盟竞价策略与收益分配[J]. 电网与清洁能源, 2022, 38(10): 158-166.
HUANG Ningxin, CHENG Lanfen, XUAN Peizheng, ZHOU Baorong, ZHOU Shangchou, JING Zhaoxia, TANG Chong. Alliance Bidding Strategy and Benefit Distribution of Multi-Operator Cascade Hydropower Participating in Day-Ahead Market[J]. Power system and Clean Energy, 2022, 38(10): 158-166.
Citation: HUANG Ningxin, CHENG Lanfen, XUAN Peizheng, ZHOU Baorong, ZHOU Shangchou, JING Zhaoxia, TANG Chong. Alliance Bidding Strategy and Benefit Distribution of Multi-Operator Cascade Hydropower Participating in Day-Ahead Market[J]. Power system and Clean Energy, 2022, 38(10): 158-166.

多主体梯级水电参与日前市场的联盟竞价策略与收益分配

Alliance Bidding Strategy and Benefit Distribution of Multi-Operator Cascade Hydropower Participating in Day-Ahead Market

  • 摘要: 中国河流流域梯级水电众多,且存在同一流域上下游电站所属发电集团不同的情况。由于梯级上下游电站间的耦合关系复杂,当多主体梯级水电分别参与日前市场竞价时,可能会使上下游出清结果不匹配,导致水电收益降低、弃水增加。通过联盟竞价,联盟体充分考虑上下游电站的水力耦合关系,提交相匹配的投标决策,能够提高梯级水电参与日前市场的收益,减少弃水流量。为此,文中提出了梯级联盟投标策略优化模型,将梯级联盟最优投标和日前市场优化出清分别作为模型的上、下层,再利用KKT(karush-kuhntucker)条件和对偶理论将双层模型化为单层混合整数线性规划模型;采用沙普利值(shapley value)方法对多主体梯级水电的联盟竞价收益进行分配;通过算例仿真验证了该模型的有效性和合理性。

     

    Abstract: China has many cascade hydropower plants in her river basins,and the upstream and downstream plants in the same basin often belong to different market players. Due to the complex coupling relationship between upstream and downstream plants, when the cascade hydropower plants belonging to different entities participate in the day-ahead market bidding respectively,the clearing results of upstream and downstream may not match,resulting in the decrease of hydropower revenue and the increase of spill flow. Alliance bidding fully considers the hydraulic coupling relationship between upstream and downstream plants,and therefore can produce a well-matched bidding decision,which can improve the revenue of cascade hydropower plants in the day-ahead market and reduce the spill flow. In this paper,a bidding strategy optimization model of cascade alliance is proposed,in which the optimal bidding strategy of cascade alliance and the clearing of day-ahead market are taken as the upper and lower levels of the model respectively,and then the bilevel model is transformed into a monolayer mixed integer linear programming model by Karush-Kuhn-Tucker(KKT) conditions and dual theory. In addition,the Shapley Value is introduced to allocate the revenue of multi-operator cascade alliance. Finally,the effectiveness and rationality of the model are verified by simulation.

     

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