符杨, 宋妍霖, 邓莉荣, 杨仑. 内嵌新能源不确定性的综合能源市场机制设计[J]. 电网技术, 2025, 49(5): 1848-1858. DOI: 10.13335/j.1000-3673.pst.2024.1813
引用本文: 符杨, 宋妍霖, 邓莉荣, 杨仑. 内嵌新能源不确定性的综合能源市场机制设计[J]. 电网技术, 2025, 49(5): 1848-1858. DOI: 10.13335/j.1000-3673.pst.2024.1813
FU Yang, SONG Yanlin, DENG Lirong, YANG Lun. Mechanism Design for Integrated Energy Market Considering Renewable Energy Uncertainties[J]. Power System Technology, 2025, 49(5): 1848-1858. DOI: 10.13335/j.1000-3673.pst.2024.1813
Citation: FU Yang, SONG Yanlin, DENG Lirong, YANG Lun. Mechanism Design for Integrated Energy Market Considering Renewable Energy Uncertainties[J]. Power System Technology, 2025, 49(5): 1848-1858. DOI: 10.13335/j.1000-3673.pst.2024.1813

内嵌新能源不确定性的综合能源市场机制设计

Mechanism Design for Integrated Energy Market Considering Renewable Energy Uncertainties

  • 摘要: 随着高比例新能源接入综合能源系统,传统的确定性市场机制无法充分考虑新能源的不可预测性。该文提出了一种内嵌新能源不确定性的热-电综合能源市场定价及分配机制。采用基于Wasserstein距离的分布鲁棒机会约束对新能源不确定性建模,综合考虑热能传输延迟等系统运行约束,建立了综合能源市场出清模型。根据影子价格理论,推导出新能源不确定性、各能源设备提供的备用容量的影子价格以及能源设备所在节点的节点边际价格。基于以上定价,提出奖惩分明的综合能源市场价值分配机制。各能源设备通过提供能量和备用服务获得收益,同时该机制对新能源不确定性和负荷单独收取合理的费用。该文验证了所提市场机制在完全市场竞争条件下满足激励相容、个体理性和社会福利最大化的性质。算例结果表明,与基于矩信息的分布鲁棒定价相比,所提方法充分利用了历史数据,降低了结果的保守性,单独制定不确定性价格分量,保证新能源主体合理收益,有序推动新能源参与市场交易。

     

    Abstract: With the increasing penetration of renewable energy sources, traditional deterministic pricing mechanisms may not fully capture their unpredictable characteristics. This paper proposes a pricing and allocation mechanism for the integrated heat and electricity market considering renewable energy uncertainties. It employs distributionally robust chance constraints based on Wasserstein distance to model the renewable energy uncertainties endogenously. Then, an integrated energy market clearing model is developed, considering system operational constraints such as heat transfer time delay. The shadow price of uncertainties from renewable energy, reserves provided by energy sources, and the locational marginal price of nodes where energy sources are located are derived through shadow price theory. Based on the pricing method, an integrated heat and electricity market value allocation mechanism with clear rewards and penalties is proposed, which rewards power output, reserve capacity, and real-time reserve provided by energy sources while charging a reasonable fee for renewable energy uncertainties and loads separately. This paper proves the proposed pricing mechanism guarantees incentive compatibility, individual rationality and social welfare maximization in a perfectly competitive market. Case studies validate that compared with distributionally robust pricing based on moment information, the proposed method ensures reasonable revenue for renewable energy resources and promotes their orderly participation in the market by characterizing their uncertainties more accurately and formulating the price component of uncertainty separately.

     

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