Abstract: The introduction of carbon emission and green certificate trading markets can help enhance the market competitiveness of renewable generators, facilitating the development of renewable energy and achieving the goal of low-carbon transition in the power industry. Under the coupled multiple markets of electricity, carbon, and green certificate, how to examine renewable generators' strategic behaviors and their impacts is an important research task. For this purpose, a game equilibrium model for the coupled electricity-carbon-green certificate markets is developed, taking into consideration the uncertainty in renewable generators' output. This model considers renewable and conventional generators' strategic bidding behaviors in the coupled electricity-carbon-green certificate markets. In addition, a deviation penalty mechanism is introduced to deal with the bidding deviations of renewable generators. The nonlinear complementarity approach is applied to solve the equilibrium model. Finally, numerical examples are presented to validate the reasonableness and effectiveness of the proposed model. The results show that compared with introducing the carbon market or the green certificate market alone, introducing both the carbon and green certificate markets can be more helpful in improving the market competitiveness of renewable generators and reducing carbon emissions.