王泽淇, 贾燕冰, 韩肖清, 陈俊先, 李伊竹林, 张世懿. 考虑产消者响应与不确定性的微能网双层混合博弈优化[J]. 电网技术, 2024, 48(7): 2754-2764. DOI: 10.13335/j.1000-3673.pst.2023.1851
引用本文: 王泽淇, 贾燕冰, 韩肖清, 陈俊先, 李伊竹林, 张世懿. 考虑产消者响应与不确定性的微能网双层混合博弈优化[J]. 电网技术, 2024, 48(7): 2754-2764. DOI: 10.13335/j.1000-3673.pst.2023.1851
WANG Zeqi, JIA Yanbing, HAN Xiaoqing, CHEN Junxian, LI Yizhulin, ZHANG Shiyi. Optimization of a Two-layer Hybrid Game Between Micro-energy Networks and Producer-consumers Considering Demand Response and Uncertainty[J]. Power System Technology, 2024, 48(7): 2754-2764. DOI: 10.13335/j.1000-3673.pst.2023.1851
Citation: WANG Zeqi, JIA Yanbing, HAN Xiaoqing, CHEN Junxian, LI Yizhulin, ZHANG Shiyi. Optimization of a Two-layer Hybrid Game Between Micro-energy Networks and Producer-consumers Considering Demand Response and Uncertainty[J]. Power System Technology, 2024, 48(7): 2754-2764. DOI: 10.13335/j.1000-3673.pst.2023.1851

考虑产消者响应与不确定性的微能网双层混合博弈优化

Optimization of a Two-layer Hybrid Game Between Micro-energy Networks and Producer-consumers Considering Demand Response and Uncertainty

  • 摘要: 随着分布式能源的发展,传统用户具备发电能力而成为产消者(production and consumption users,PCU)的趋势愈演愈烈,该文主要研究了同一微能网下大量产消者的协同运行问题。电价不确定性和产消者响应给微能网协同不同利益主体的PCU之间的调度带来困难。在此背景下提出考虑产消者响应与电价不确定性的微能网与产消者混合博弈优化策略。首先,构建产消者响应模型和电价不确定性模型,引入效用函数来描述PCU的满意程度,采用鲁棒优化和机会约束方法描述电价的不确定性与新能源出力的不确定性。其次,构建混合博弈模型,即上层微能网运营商(integrated energy operator,IEO)与下层PCU之间的主从博弈模型和下层PCU联盟之间的合作博弈模型。上层IEO作为主从博弈的领导者以运行成本最小化为目标,通过为产消者制定电价、热价引导产消者的用能需求;下层产消者作为跟随者,以效益最大为目标通过合作方式对IEO的决策进行产消者响应。PCU之间的合作博弈以纳什议价的方式进行,将PCU模型等效为联盟收益最大化和合作分配两个子问题。基于KKT条件利用Big-M法和McCormick包络法将双层问题转换为单层混合整数线性规划问题求解主从博弈,结合交替方向乘子法(alternating direction multiplier method,ADMM)求解下层合作博弈。结果表明,该文所提策略有效协调了微能网与PCU的调度并保证了PCU合作联盟的公平性。

     

    Abstract: With the development of distributed energy resources, there is an increasing trend for traditional users to become production and consumption users (PCUs) with generation capacity, and this paper focuses on the cooperative operation of many production and consumption users under the same micro-energy network. The tariff uncertainty and the response of production and consumption users bring difficulties in scheduling between PCUs with different interests in micro energy networks. In this context, a hybrid game optimization strategy between the micro energy network and the consumers is proposed to consider the response of the consumers and the tariff uncertainty. First, the consumer response model and the tariff uncertainty model are constructed, the utility function is introduced to describe the satisfaction degree of PCU, and the robust optimization and opportunity constraint methods are used to describe the tariff uncertainty and the uncertainty of new energy output. Second, a hybrid game model is constructed, i.e., a master-slave game model between the upper-layer Integrated Energy Operator (IEO) and the lower-layer PCUs and a cooperative game model between the lower-layer PCU alliances. As the leader of the master-slave game, the upper-level IEO aims to minimize the operation cost and guide the energy demand of the consumers and producers by setting the electricity and heat prices for them. In contrast, the lower-level consumers, and producers, as the followers, aim to maximize revenues by cooperating and responding to the decisions made by the IEOs. The cooperative game between the PCUs is carried out in a Nash bargaining manner, which makes the PCU model equivalent to two sub-problems: maximizing the union's revenues and cooperative allocation subproblems. Based on the KKT condition, the two-layer problem is converted into a single-layer mixed-integer linear programming problem by using the Big-M method and McCormick's envelope method to solve the master-slave game, and the lower cooperative game is solved by combining the alternating direction multiplier method (ADMM). The results show that the strategy proposed in this paper effectively coordinates the scheduling of the micro energy network and PCUs and ensures the fairness of the cooperative union of PCUs.

     

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