董雷, 倪佳炜, 张师铭, 王晓辉, 乔骥, 韩富佳. 基于双重博弈的电价套餐设计方法[J]. 电网技术, 2024, 48(2): 688-696. DOI: 10.13335/j.1000-3673.pst.2023.0966
引用本文: 董雷, 倪佳炜, 张师铭, 王晓辉, 乔骥, 韩富佳. 基于双重博弈的电价套餐设计方法[J]. 电网技术, 2024, 48(2): 688-696. DOI: 10.13335/j.1000-3673.pst.2023.0966
DONG Lei, NI Jiawei, ZHANG Shiming, WANG Xiaohui, QIAO Ji, HAN Fujia. Designing of Electricity Price Package Method Based on Dual Game[J]. Power System Technology, 2024, 48(2): 688-696. DOI: 10.13335/j.1000-3673.pst.2023.0966
Citation: DONG Lei, NI Jiawei, ZHANG Shiming, WANG Xiaohui, QIAO Ji, HAN Fujia. Designing of Electricity Price Package Method Based on Dual Game[J]. Power System Technology, 2024, 48(2): 688-696. DOI: 10.13335/j.1000-3673.pst.2023.0966

基于双重博弈的电价套餐设计方法

Designing of Electricity Price Package Method Based on Dual Game

  • 摘要: 在“双碳”目标背景下,新型电力系统的调节能力面临新的重大挑战,用户侧灵活资源作为发电调度的重要补充,越来越受到国内外广泛关注。根据居民用户用电特点及行为差异制定需求响应策略可在提升用户参与响应的积极性的同时,有效促进电力资源合理配置。提出了一种基于双重博弈的电价套餐设计方法,将售电公司与居民用户间的利益冲突构建为主从博弈模型,进而根据居民用户聚类结果构建不同用户的套餐选择与响应行为的演化博弈模型,有效解决用户侧多主体决策优化问题。最后,算例结果证明了所提方法的可行性,该方法能够通过设计电价套餐引导用户进行灵活的套餐选择并改变用能行为,兼顾削峰填谷与低碳排放的目标。

     

    Abstract: Amidst the goals of "carbon peaking and carbon neutrality", the novel electric power systems are faced with great/ challenges pertaining to their regulatory capabilities. The flexibility resources on the users' side, serving as a significant supplement to power dispatching, are garnering increasing attentions both domestically and internationally. Formulating demand response strategies in accordance with the residential users' electricity usage characteristics and their behavioral differences can not only enhance the willingness of users to participate in the response, but also effectively promote the rational allocation of electricity resources. This paper introduces a price package designing method based on the dual game theory. The conflicting interests between the power selling company and the residential users are constructed as a master-slave game model. Then, according to the clustering results of the residential users, the evolutionary game models with the package choices and the response behaviors for different users are built in order to effectively solve the multi-agent decision optimization problem on the users' side. Last, through an example, the feasibility of the proposed method is demonstrated. This method, by designing electricity price packages, is able to guide the users to make flexible package choices and change their energy use behavior, thereby achieving the objectives of peak shaving, valley filling, and low carbon emissions.

     

/

返回文章
返回