Abstract: In order to solve the economic dispatch problem of an islanded electric vehicle charging station (EVCS) and realize the orderly charging of electric vehicles (EVs) and the optimal revenue of the EVCS, a bi-level optimal scheduling model is established based on the Stackelberg game in this paper. Meanwhile, the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium point is proved theoretically. As the leader of the game, the charging station operator (CSO) on the upper layer of the model manages the station energy and the revenue increases by setting the charging prices for EVs. The EVs as the followers take account of different sensitivities of the EV owners to the electricity price and decide the charging demands constrained by the charging powers of the station and different EVs. For searching the unique optimal value, this paper employs a finite-time average consensus algorithm to calculate the payment functions. Subsequently, a hierarchical decentralized algorithm is used to calculate the charge of the corresponding EV when the payment function of each EV owner converges to the optimal value. The followers obtain a trade-off between the energy consumption and the payment, by playing with each other and then with the CSO. The simulation results show that the algorithm proposed in this paper realizes the orderly charging of EVs while optimizing the revenue of the CSOs.