陈中瑶, 林凯颖, 王蓓蓓, 徐立中, 张思, 郑亚先. 单侧放开市场中基于Stackelberg均衡分析的最低效率损失需求响应激励机制设计[J]. 电网技术, 2022, 46(5): 1790-1799. DOI: 10.13335/j.1000-3673.pst.2021.1898
引用本文: 陈中瑶, 林凯颖, 王蓓蓓, 徐立中, 张思, 郑亚先. 单侧放开市场中基于Stackelberg均衡分析的最低效率损失需求响应激励机制设计[J]. 电网技术, 2022, 46(5): 1790-1799. DOI: 10.13335/j.1000-3673.pst.2021.1898
CHEN Zhongyao, LIN Kaiying, WANG Beibei, XU Lizhong, ZHANG Si, ZHENG Yaxian. Design of Demand Response Incentive Mechanism Considering Lowest Efficiency Loss Based on Stackelberg Equilibrium Analysis in Unilateral Liberalization Market[J]. Power System Technology, 2022, 46(5): 1790-1799. DOI: 10.13335/j.1000-3673.pst.2021.1898
Citation: CHEN Zhongyao, LIN Kaiying, WANG Beibei, XU Lizhong, ZHANG Si, ZHENG Yaxian. Design of Demand Response Incentive Mechanism Considering Lowest Efficiency Loss Based on Stackelberg Equilibrium Analysis in Unilateral Liberalization Market[J]. Power System Technology, 2022, 46(5): 1790-1799. DOI: 10.13335/j.1000-3673.pst.2021.1898

单侧放开市场中基于Stackelberg均衡分析的最低效率损失需求响应激励机制设计

Design of Demand Response Incentive Mechanism Considering Lowest Efficiency Loss Based on Stackelberg Equilibrium Analysis in Unilateral Liberalization Market

  • 摘要: 发电商单侧竞价的电力现货市场是我国电力现货市场试点省份普遍采用的市场模式,激励型需求响应(incentive- based demand response,IDR)作为负荷侧资源参与市场可提高系统灵活性,亟待纳入当前单侧竞价的现货市场中。针对不同IDR激励策略将导致不同的效率损失这一问题,构建了单侧竞价现货市场中融入负荷侧资源参与的IDR实施市场架构,提出了市场效率损失比以量化分析不同激励策略对市场效率的作用影响。考虑独立系统运营商(Independent System Operator,ISO)、发电商和IDR用户的不同博弈方式,建立了基于Stackelberg均衡分析的最低效率损失激励型需求响应模型,最后通过3节点和118节点网络验证了所提方法的有效性和合理性。上述机制能够在单侧竞价的电力现货市场中有计划、有步骤地逐步引入用户侧参与元素,并实现市场整体效率损失最低的需求响应激励强度设计。

     

    Abstract: The electricity spot market with the unilateral bidding by power generators is a market model commonly used in my country's electricity spot market pilot provinces. The participation of the Incentive-based Demand Response (IDR) in the market as a load-side resource may improve the system flexibility and needs to be incorporated into the current market with one-sided bidding. In view of the problem that different IDR incentive strategies will lead to different efficiency losses, this paper constructs an IDR implementation market structure that incorporates load-side resource participation in the unilateral bidding spot market, and constructs the market efficiency loss ratio to quantitatively analyze the impact of different incentive strategies on the market. Considering the different game modes of the Independent System Operators (ISO), the generators and the IDR users, a minimum efficiency loss incentive demand response model based on the Stackelberg equilibrium analysis is established. Finally, through the 3-node and the 118-node network the effectiveness and rationality of the method are verified. The mechanism proposed in this paper will gradually introduce user-side participation elements in a planned and step-by-step way in the electricity spot market with unilateral bidding, and realize the demand response incentive intensity design with the lowest overall efficiency loss in the market.

     

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