张释中, 裴玮, 马腾飞, 李淑锋, 王方胜, 唐成虹. 面向配电侧户用光伏无功激励奖励的纳什议价方法[J]. 电网技术, 2021, 45(8): 3079-3086. DOI: 10.13335/j.1000-3673.pst.2020.1631
引用本文: 张释中, 裴玮, 马腾飞, 李淑锋, 王方胜, 唐成虹. 面向配电侧户用光伏无功激励奖励的纳什议价方法[J]. 电网技术, 2021, 45(8): 3079-3086. DOI: 10.13335/j.1000-3673.pst.2020.1631
ZHANG Shizhong, PEI Wei, MA Tengfei, LI Shufeng, WANG Fangsheng, TANG Chenghong. Nash Bargaining for Reactive Power Incentive andReward of Photovoltaic in Distribution Network[J]. Power System Technology, 2021, 45(8): 3079-3086. DOI: 10.13335/j.1000-3673.pst.2020.1631
Citation: ZHANG Shizhong, PEI Wei, MA Tengfei, LI Shufeng, WANG Fangsheng, TANG Chenghong. Nash Bargaining for Reactive Power Incentive andReward of Photovoltaic in Distribution Network[J]. Power System Technology, 2021, 45(8): 3079-3086. DOI: 10.13335/j.1000-3673.pst.2020.1631

面向配电侧户用光伏无功激励奖励的纳什议价方法

Nash Bargaining for Reactive Power Incentive andReward of Photovoltaic in Distribution Network

  • 摘要: 随着可再生能源的发展,大量光伏接入配电网造成了严重的电压越限问题,提出户用光伏参与无功调节的方法解决该问题,并基于讨价还价博弈理论研究了光伏无功的激励奖励机制。首先构建了电网和用户的合作双层优化模型,外层模型以年综合费用最低为目标优化无功补偿设备的配置,内层模型以网损最小为目标优化系统的运行,二者通过合作产生了合作剩余。进而基于纳什议价理论构建了电网和用户的收益分配模型,制定了合理的光伏无功激励奖励机制,使得合作剩余能够在电网和用户间得到合理分配,维护二者的合作关系。最后通过算例验证了所提方法和模型的有效性,电网和用户通过合作有效解决了系统电压越限问题,保证了系统运行的安全性和稳定性,同时提高了双方的收益。

     

    Abstract: With the development of renewable energy, a large amount of photovoltaic (PV) is connected to the distribution network, which causes the serious over-voltage problem. This paper proposes a method for household PV to participate in reactive power regulation to solve this problem, and studies the incentive and reward mechanism of PV reactive power based on the bargaining game theory. Firstly, a cooperative two-layer optimization model between the power grid and the users is constructed. The outer model optimizes the configuration of the reactive power compensation equipment with the goal of minimizing the overall annual cost, while the inner model optimizes the operation of the system with the goal of minimizing the network loss. The cooperation between the two generates the cooperation surplus. Then, based on bargaining game theory, the income distribution model of the power grid and the users is constructed, and a reasonable PV reactive power incentive and reward mechanism is established in this way, the cooperative surplus can be reasonably distributed between the power grid and the users, and the cooperative relationship between them maintains. Finally, an example is given to verify the effectiveness of the method and model proposed in this paper. The power grid and the users can effectively solve the system voltage overlimit problem through cooperation, which ensures the security and stability of the system operation and improves the profits of both sides.

     

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