常忠蛟, 刘云. 巴西“3.21”大停电后电网恢复情况分析[J]. 电网技术, 2021, 45(3): 1078-1088. DOI: 10.13335/j.1000-3673.pst.2020.0571
引用本文: 常忠蛟, 刘云. 巴西“3.21”大停电后电网恢复情况分析[J]. 电网技术, 2021, 45(3): 1078-1088. DOI: 10.13335/j.1000-3673.pst.2020.0571
CHANG Zhongjiao, LIU Yun. Analysis on Brazilian Power Grid Restoration After "March 21" Blackout[J]. Power System Technology, 2021, 45(3): 1078-1088. DOI: 10.13335/j.1000-3673.pst.2020.0571
Citation: CHANG Zhongjiao, LIU Yun. Analysis on Brazilian Power Grid Restoration After "March 21" Blackout[J]. Power System Technology, 2021, 45(3): 1078-1088. DOI: 10.13335/j.1000-3673.pst.2020.0571

巴西“3.21”大停电后电网恢复情况分析

Analysis on Brazilian Power Grid Restoration After "March 21" Blackout

  • 摘要: 2018年3月21日,巴西电网发生大停电,电网解列为北方、东北和南方电网3个独立运行电网,23个州的供电受到影响,全网损失26%负荷。大停电后,巴西调度部门、发电厂、输电公司和配电公司等协调配合恢复供电。该进程分为2部分,一是独立运行电网内部子网恢复网架及负荷供电;二是独立运行电网间互联,加强相互支援。大停电后,北方电网依靠2座保持在运电厂支撑,设置了4个子网,逐步恢复电网供电。东北电网大停电后全停,通过网内5座具备自启动功能的电厂,设置了6个子网同时黑启动,逐步恢复电网供电。南方电网架基本保持完整。北方、东北和南方3个独立运行电网适时合上网间联络线,恢复全网同步运行。电网恢复进程总体有序,同时,也遇到一些异常情况,包括:现场操作与调度指令有差异;电网潮流大范围自由转移,引起振荡,导致并网合环等操作困难;监控和通信系统故障;断路器、站用电、发电机等设备异常。此次电网恢复过程表明电网恢复的及时性和安全性具有进一步优化提升空间,主要包括:加强电源规划与维护、电网结构配置、设备维护、调度管理等方面。

     

    Abstract: On March 21, 2018, during the power grid failure, the Brazilian national power grid (sistema interligado nacional, SIN) was disintegrated into 3 islands: the Northern, the Northeastern, and the Southern power grids were in independent operation modes with the power supply of 23 states affected and 26% load of the whole power grid lost. The dispatching departments, together with a plenty of power plants, transmission companies and distribution companies nationwide, tried to restore the power supply in time. The restoration was divided into two steps. The first step was to restore power supply with loads inside the 3 independent operation grids themselves. The second was to realize the interconnection between the 3 independent operating power grids, strengthen their mutual supports and take anti-measures to avoid the risks of another failure. After the blackout, the Southern power grid basically maintained its structural integrity, and the restoration process mainly focused on the voltage control and the rapid load restoration. Thanks to the 2 power plants keeping operations, the North power grid configured 4 recovery work-interfaces to restore the power supply gradually. The Northeast power grid had to conduct a black-start by configuring 6 recovery work-interfaces with the help of its 5 power plants with self-start capabilities in order to restore the power supply. Although the restoration process of the overall power grids were basically timely and orderly, some difficulties were encountered, including differences between on-site operations and dispatching commands, operating difficulties of both the closing loop and integration into the grid resulting from the system oscillation and the large-scale free shifting of power flows, failures of the supervision and communication systems, the breaker operation abnormalities, auxiliary power supply failure, self-starting anomalies of the generators, etc. It shows that some aspects should be considered aiming to optimize and improve the power grid restoration and reconstruction, including planning and maintenance of the power plants, the power grid structure configuration, and equipment maintenance, dispatching management and implementation, and so on.

     

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